Search, Design, and Market Structure by Bar-Isaac, Heski - NYU Stern School of Business et al.
 
 
NET Institute* 
 
www.NETinst.org 
 
 
 
Working Paper #09-17 
 
September 2009 
 
 
Search, Design, and Market Structure 
 
Heski Bar-Isaac 
Stern School of Business, NYU 
 
Guillermo Caruana 
CEMFI 
 
Vicente Cuñat 
London School of Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The Networks, Electronic Commerce, and Telecommunications (“NET”) Institute, 
http://www.NETinst.org, is a non-profit institution devoted to research on network 
industries, electronic commerce, telecommunications, the Internet, “virtual networks” 
comprised of computers that share the same technical standard or operating system, and 
on network issues in general. 
Search, Design, and Market Structure1
Heski Bar-Isaac Guillermo Caruana Vicente Cuñat
NYU CEMFI LSE
September, 2009
Abstract
The Internet has made consumer search much easier with consequences for compe-
tition, industry structure and product o¤erings. We explore these consequences in a
rich but tractable model that allows for strategic design choices. We nd a polarized
market structure, where some rms choose designs aiming for broad-based audiences,
while others target narrow niches. Such an industry structure can arise even when all
rms and consumers are ex-ante identical. We perform comparative statics and show
the e¤ect of a fall in search costs on the designs, market shares, prices, and prots
of di¤erent rms. In particular, a fall in search costs, through the e¤ect on product
designs, can lead to higher industry prices and prots. In characterizing sales distribu-
tions, our analysis is related to discussions of how the Internet has led to the prevalence
of niche goods and the long tail and superstar phenomena.
1 Introduction
The Internet has changed the nature of demand and competition in numerous industries.
A signicant and growing literature has sought to examine this impact both theoretically
and empirically, drawing on older models of consumer search.2 Much of this work was
1Previous versions have circulated as Costly Search and Design. We thank for their helpful com-
ments Michael Baye, Juanjo Ganuza, Avi Goldfarb, Maarten Janssen, George Mailath, Eric Rasmussen,
Michael Rauh, Andrew Rhodes, and excellent seminar participants at the IIOC (Boston 2009), the North
American meeting of the Econometric Society (Boston 2009), 2nd Workshop on the Economics of Adver-
tising and Marketing (St-Germain en Laye), the Madrid Summer Workshop in Economic Theory 2009,
University or Pennsylvania, and the Stern work-in-progress lunch. Financial support from the NET Insti-
tute (http://www.NETinst.org) is gratefully acknowledged. Guillermo Caruana acknowledges the nancial
support of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through the Consolider-Ingenio 2010 Project
Consolidating Economics.
Contact info: Bar-Isaac: heski@nyu.edu; Department of Economics, Stern School of Business, NYU, 44
West 4th street 7-73, NYC, NY 10012 USA; Caruana: caruana@cem.es; Casado del Alisal 5, 28014 Madrid,
Spain; and Cuñat: v.cunat@lse.ac.uk, Room A450, Department of Finance, London School of Economics,
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, U.K.
2A relatively early and inuential example is Bakos (1997). Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2006) provide
an excellent overview with a particular focus on price dispersion.
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focused on the persistence of price dispersion with less attention devoted to the impact on
market structure. However, recently, there has been considerable interest, both popular
and academic, in how new production and search technologies have changed the pattern
of sales and the market shares of the most popular goods as compared to fringe goods in
the long tail.3
This paper maintains a focus on market structure but allows for a richer set of rm
strategies than typically considered. Specically, it considers rms that choose the design
or marketing of their products from a broad set of options. Our starting point is that
rms, through their choices of marketing and product design, have some ability to a¤ect
the nature of demand that they face.
A growing literature, notably Johnson and Myatt (2006) and Lewis and Sappington
(1994), has considered these choices. More recently, Bar-Isaac, Caruana and Cuñat (2008,
2009) put more emphasis on consumersinformation-gathering decisions and highlight that
these are co-determined with the rms pricing and marketing strategies in equilibrium.
This literature has focused on monopoly settings. Instead this paper is one of the rst
to extend this analysis to a competitive environment. In order to do so, we incorporate
the notion of product design to an established model that considers consumers who search
both to obtain price-quotes and to learn about the extent to which di¤erentiated goods
suit them (Wolinsky, 1986; Bakos, 1997; Anderson and Renault, 1999). In particular,
the model allows us to view the impact of search engines, the Internet, communication
technologies and information technologies, in general, as a fall in search costs and consider
its consequences.4 This approach leads to a wide variety of results that shed light on the
coexistence of niche goods with mass market strategies, the related long tailphenomenon
and how search a¤ects the nature of competition, industry structure, and the kinds of
product o¤ered.
Formally, we consider rms that compete by choosing price and designalong the lines
of Johnson and Myatts (2006) model of a monopoly rotating demand: Here, competitive
3The phrase was coined in an article in Wired, (Anderson, 2004), and later expanded and developed in
Anderson (2006). It refers to the well-documented and dramatic increase in the market share for goods in
the tail of the sales distribution. See Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith (2006) for a discussion and references to
academic work.
4There is a small related literature that considers rms that vary design in response to falling search costs.
Larson (2008) studies horizontal di¤erentiation in a model of sequential search with a particular emphasis
on welfare considerations in what can be viewed as a special case of our model. Kuksov (2004) presents a
duopoly model where consumers know the varieties available (but not their location) prior to search and
di¤erent designs come with di¤erent costs associated and Cachon, Terwiesch and Xu (forthcoming) and
Watson (2007) focus specically on multi-product rms, where consumers search costlessly within a rm
but at some cost between rms. Our model allows for a continuum of a broad range of designs and much
more general demand specication and has a di¤erent focus and results to these papers, which, for example,
do not consider sales distributions explicitly.
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rms can choose designs from a range which vary between broad market designs that are
ino¤ensive to all consumers, or more niche or quirky designs which are either loved or
loathed.5 Consumers search among rms in a way that is standard in models of costly
sequential search: Each consumer can pay a small cost to obtain a price-quote from an
additional rm and learn about the extent to which the product o¤ered by that rm is
well-suited to his tastes.
The model generates a number of simple and interesting results. First, rms choose
extremal product designs; that is, either a most broad-based design or a most niche de-
sign. Second, more-advantaged rms choose most-broad designs, while disadvantaged rms
prefer most niche designs.
Moreover, by allowing for an endogenous choices of product design, we are able to
analyze both the direct e¤ect of lower search costs on prices and the indirect e¤ect through
changes to the o¤ered designs. We show that lower search costs induce a larger fraction of
rms to choose niche designs.
The e¤ect of more niche designs on price can overcome the direct e¤ect of competition,
thus leading to prices and prots being non-monotonic in search costs. There is a clear
intuition: With low search costs, and consumers visiting many stores, rms have to o¤er
consumers something very attractive not only in terms of price, but also in terms of the
utility that the good provides. This latter consideration leads rms to choose niche designs,
but e¤ectively these niche designs di¤erentiate rms and so soften price competition.
Reduced search costs and endogenous designs also have interesting e¤ects on sales
distributions. Lower search costs allow consumers to nd betterrms. This, in turn,
leads better rms to be even more successful. Thus reduced search costs allow for superstar
e¤ects.6 However, lower search costs also allow consumers to search longer for better-suited
products. As a consequence, more rms provide niche products. This results in a long-tail
e¤ect where niche products have higher sales.7 Thus, in our model, lower search costs
can explain both superstar and long-tail e¤ects, which can arise simultaneously (as shown
empirically in Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006).8 Moreover, the mechanisms and results
do not rely on ex-ante rm heterogeneity, in contrast to this previous literature: these
5Note that one does not need a physical design interpretation to induce demand rotations. Firms might
similarly induce demand rotations through providing more or less information: In an e-commerce application
this might take the form of more or less detailed product descriptions.
6Goldmanis et al. 2009 consider better rms to be low cost (rather than high quality) and nd such a
superstar e¤ect both theoretically and empirically.
7This is only a partial intuition insofar as consumer and rm behavior are co-determined in equilibrium.
8Furhter evidence on simultaneous long-tail and superstar e¤ects appears in Osterreicher-Singer and
Sundarajan (2008), and Tucker and Zhang (2007). Hervas-Drane (2009) provides further references and
a model that contrasts two di¤erent channels (sequential search and ex-ante recommendations) through
which the Internet might generate superstar and long tail e¤ects.
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e¤ects can arise even when all rms and consumers are ex-ante identical.
2 Model
There is a continuum of rms of measure 1. Each rm produces a single product. There
is a continuum of consumers of measure m. Each consumer, l, has tastes described by a
conditional utility function (not including any search costs) of the form
uli(pi) =  pi + vi + "li (1)
if she buys product i at price pi. The term vi can be thought of as the natural quality
of rm i. Meanwhile, "li can be interpreted as a match value between consumer l and
product i and is the realization of a random variable with distribution Fi. We assume that
realizations of "li are independent across rms and individuals.9 These match components
are intended to capture that some products might be better suited to some consumers than
to others. Note that we assume that consumers are risk neutral.
A consumer incurs a search cost c to learn the price pi and the match value "li for the
product o¤ered by any particular rm i. Consumers search sequentially. The utility of a
consumer l is given by
ulk(pk)  kc, (2)
if she buys product k at price pk at the kth rm she visits. From now on, and for simplicity,
we will omit the rm and consumer subscripts, unless there is ambiguity.
Firms cannot a¤ect v which we assume to be the exogenously given quality of the good,
distributed according to some continuously di¤erentiable distribution H(v) with support
(v; v).
We introduce the notion of design by supposing that the distribution of the match-
specic component of consumer tastes Fs can be a¤ected by the rm by picking a design
s 2 S = [B;N ]. That is, designs range from a most broad (B) to a most niche (N) design. A
design s leads to "li distributed according to Fs() with support on some bounded interval
(s; s) and logconcave and positive densities fs(). Regardless of design and intrinsic
quality, the rm produces goods at a marginal cost of 0.
The strategy for each rm, therefore, consists not only of a choice of price p, but also
(in a departure from Wolinsky (1986), Bakos (1997) and Anderson and Renault (1999)) of
9Taking these realizations to be independent, while consistent with the previous literature on search
(Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999)) is not without loss of generality. It does not permit
modelling that di¤erent rms might attempt to target di¤erent niches. That is, there is no spatial notion of
di¤erentiation or product positioning. However, given that we assume a continuum of rms and no ability
for consumers to determine location in advance, this assumption may be more reasonable. Some of the
outcomes are similar to the ones of a spatial model (see Bakos, 1997).
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a choice of a product design s 2 D. We suppose that there are no costs associated with
choosing di¤erent designs s.
We follow Johnson and Myatt (2006) in supposing that di¤erent product designs induce
demand rotations. Formally, there is a family of rotation points ys such that
@Fs()
@s < 0
for  > ys and
@Fs()
@s > 0 for  < 
y
s; further 
y
s is increasing in s. The concept of a
demand rotation is a formal approach to the notion that some designs lead to a wider
spread in consumer valuations than others. In particular, a higher value of s should be
interpreted as a more quirkyproduct which appeals more to some consumers and less
to others, the bounds on s correspond to most broad (B) styles of design and most niche
(N) styles of design. This denition is general enough to accommodate a wide range of
concepts of product design. It can accommodate di¤erences in physical characteristics of
the product that make it more or less appealing to particular customers. It can also be
interpreted as the level of information provided to consumers before purchase. For this
latter interpretation the rotations must be mean preserving spreads.
Our notion of equilibrium is Nash in consumer and rm strategies.10 As is standard in
the search literature (and will be shown below), a consumers search and purchase behavior
can be described by a threshold rule U : She buys the current product obtaining uli(pi) if
this is more or equal than U; and continues searching otherwise. Therefore, in equilibrium
consumers choose a threshold U , while rms choose a pair (p; s) that depends on v.11 One
advantage to this notation is that U also represents the consumer surplus from participating
in the market.
Finally, note that there always exist equilibria where consumers do not search and rms
choose prohibitively high prices. We do not consider such equilibria if others exist.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Consumer behavior
Suppose that a consumer expects a rm of type v to choose the strategy (pv; sv).12 When
the consumer currently holds a best alternative with utility u, then if the consumer samples
an additional rm of type v she will prefer to buy its product if  pv + v + " > u. In this
case the additional utility obtained is v + "   (u + pv) and so the expected incremental
utility from searching one more rm that is expected to have design sv and price pv and
be of quality v is
10 In particular this implies passive beliefs: That is, if a consumer observes an o¤-equilibrium price or
design, it does not a¤ect her search and purchase rule.
11More broadly we can allow rms to mix, so that each rm chooses an element v 2 (R [B;N ]).
12With a continuum of rm types and no atoms in the distribution, it is without loss of generality to
assume that each type of rms chooses a pure strategy in design and price.
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gv(u)  E"(v+" p ujv+" p > u) Pr(v+" p > u) =
Z 1
u+p v
(v+" u p)fs(")d". (3)
Finally, it is worth searching exactly one more rm if and only if the expected value of
a search is worth more than the cost, where the nal expectation is taken over v (with
an implicit rm strategy for both price and design); that is, as long as E[gv(u)]  c, or,
equivalently, if u < U where U is implicitly dened by:
E [gv(U)] =
Z 1
 1
Z 1
U+pv v
(v + "  U   pv)fsv(")d"

h(v)dv = c. (4)
Note that there is at most one solution to (4) since the left hand side is strictly de-
creasing in U (as the integrand is decreasing in U and the lower limit of the inner integral
is increasing in U). For c large enough, there is no feasible positive U that satises (4): no
consumer would ever continue searching and rms would have full monopoly power (as in
Diamond, 1971). In other words, the consumer initiates search if and only if U  0.
3.2 Firm prot maximization
Suppose that consumers are using a U -threshold strategy. Consider now the problem of a
rm of type v maximizing prots by choosing (p; s). Consumers who visit the rm would
choose to buy as long as they receive a match " such that v   p + " > U . Thus, the
probability of sale is 1  Fs(p+ U   v).
We dene  as the expected probability that a consumer who visits a random rm buys
from that rm; this is exogenous from the perspective of rm v. The expected number of
consumers who visit rm v as a rst visit is m, a further m(1 ) visit the rm as a second
visit, m(1   )2 as a third visit, and so on. Thus, the total number of visits is m . Each
time a consumer visits rm v she purchase with probability 1   Fs(p + U   v). We can,
therefore, write demand for rm v that chooses a design s and price p as
Dv(p; s)  m

(1  Fs(p+ U   v)). (5)
and its prots as
 =
m

p(1  Fs(p+ U   v)). (6)
It is useful to dene pvs(U) as rm vs prot-maximizing price when the consumers
threshold is U and the design strategy is s:
pvs(U)  argmax p(1  Fs(p+ U   v)). (7)
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This price is implicitly determined as
pvs(U) =
1  Fs(pvs(U) + U   v)
fs(pvs(U) + U   v) . (8)
Now we present our rst result. Note that all proofs in the paper are in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 The prot maximizing price pvs(U) associated with a design s for a rm of type
v, when a consumers stopping rule is given by U is uniquely dened and is continuously
decreasing in the consumers reservation threshold U , and continuously increasing in the
rms quality, v. Further pvs(U) + U is continuous and increasing in U .
These properties are intuitive. A higher quality rm charges a higher price, and rms
charge lower prices when they face consumers with a higher reservation utility.
Given the denition of pvs(U), we can write prots as
 =
m

pvs(U)(1  Fs(pvs(U) + U   v)). (9)
The rms problem is to maximize this with respect to its remaining strategic variable
s. Note that neither the optimal price nor the optimal design choice depend on m or , as
these are just constant factors in prots.13
Johnson and Myatt (2006) have shown in a monopoly model that, when designs are
rotation ordered, then prots are quasi-convex in design, and, so, a monopoly rm would
always choose an extremal design. In our environment, taking the behavior of all other
rms as given, the residual demand that a rm faces is still determined through a demand
rotation. Since every rm is, in e¤ect, a monopolist on the residual demand that it faces,
the result still applies.
Proposition 1 Firms choose extremal designs, that is, every rm chooses either the most
niche (s = N) or the most broad (s = B) design.
To gain some intuition for this result, rst consider the case when the optimal price at
a given design s is below the point of rotation so that the prot-maximizing quantity is
greater than the quantity at the point of rotation 1   Fs(ys). Then, decreasing s (and so
atteningout demand) will lead to a greater quantity sold even if the price is kept xed.
Therefore decreasing s must lead to higher prots. A similar argument applies when the
optimal price is above the point of rotation.
13This highlights that search costs play a qualitatively di¤erent role to scale e¤ects, which is, of course,
a central point of Wolinsky (1986). As discussed by Anderson and Renault (1999), the limits when search
costs tend to 0 and when the ratio of rms to consumers increases are quite di¤erent.
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Using Proposition 1, we can restrict attention to equilibrium strategies in which rm
v either chooses a broad design (pvB; B), or a niche one (pvN ; N), where pvB and pvN are
dened by (8) for s = B;N respectively.
Next, we show that high-quality rms are more prone to adopt a broad strategy than
low-quality ones. We prove this as a corollary of a more general result: The more severe
the competition that a rm faces (either because consumers are more picky and require
more utility in order to purchase, or because the rm faces a disadvantage as compared
to other rms) the more likely it is to choose the niche strategy. Loosely, the intuition
here is that a rm in a disadvantageous position needs the consumer to lovethe good in
order for her to buy it. The chances of this happening increase with a design that leads to
dispersed valuations a niche design.
Proposition 2 Suppose that a rm of type bv makes positive sales when facing consumers
whose threshold rule is given by bU and is indi¤erent between choosing a broad design and a
niche design. Then if consumer behavior is characterized by U , any rm, v, of su¢ ciently
low quality with U   v > bU   bv prefers a niche strategy and any rm of su¢ ciently high
quality with v > U   bU + bv prefers a broad strategy.
Note that rms that makes no sales are indi¤erent about the design they choose. How-
ever, it is convenient for the statement of results (while having no e¤ect on equilibrium
transactions) to assume that such rms respect the design choices implied by Proposition
2.
Next, dene V as the solution to
pV B(U)(1  FB(pV B(U) + U   V )) = pV N (U)(1  FN (pV N (U) + U   V )). (10)
If V lies in the feasible range [v; v]; then V captures the rm which is indi¤erent between
choosing the broad and the nice strategy. If V falls outside this range, with some abuse of
notation, we redene it to be the appropriate extreme of the range.14 As a direct corollary
of Proposition 2, we can see that V captures the cut-o¤ rule that determines rmsdesign
strategy:
Corollary 1 All rms with v < V choose a niche design, and all rms with v > V choose
a a broad one.
Intuitively, a low v rm needs to compete harder to overcome its disadvantage in terms
of the innate quality, and so is more likely to adopt a strategy that, while unappealing to
14Mathematically, we redene V to be maxfv;minfv; gg of the solution to (10).
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many consumers, has a chance at providing a great match and being appealing to some
consumers. Instead a high value rm can to a greater extent try to appeal to many of them
by adopting the broad strategy.
This result is economically rich and appealing. For example, consider 5-star hotels
competing in a city. Even though all of them are in the same category, they di¤er in an
important dimension: location. Our model predicts that hotels that are well located (center
of the city, close to the airport or other facilities) are more likely to deliver standard services.
Meanwhile, those with worse locations are more likely to be specialized; for example, as
boutique hotels with distinctive styling or catering to minority groups, such as customers
with pets.
3.3 Equilibrium Summary
Given all the analysis above, we can express an equilibrium as a pair (U; V ), where U
summarizes the search and purchase behavior of consumers and V determines which rms
choose the broad and the niche strategy. These two parameters have to satisfy the following
conditions. First, rearranging (4), consumers optimize their behavior when
c =
Z V
 1
 Z 1
U+pvN (U) v
("  U   pvN (U) + v)fN (")d"
!
h(v)dv+
Z 1
V
 Z 1
U+pvB(U) v
("  U   pvB(U) + v)fB(")d"
!
h(v)dv.
(11)
Second, as explained above, rmsmaximizing behavior is summarized by the indi¤er-
ence of V as in (10). Third, associated with broad and niche designs are prot-maximizing
prices pvB(U) and pvN (U) as determined in (8). Finally it must be worthwhile for a con-
sumer to initiate search; that is U  0:
It is convenient to maintain notation for the expected probability that a consumer will
buy when she visits a random rm. This is given by
(U; V ) 
Z V
 1
(1  FN (U + pvN (U)  v))h(v)dv +
Z 1
V
(1  FB(U + pvB(U)  v))h(v)dv.
(12)
4 Further Characterization
Next, we consider a series of general results and properties of the equilibria. A full charac-
terization of the equilibria requires further structure on the distributions of matches fs()
and quality h(). Thus, we continue later by exemplifying the model in Sections 5 and 6
for particular choices of these distributions.
It is useful to consider rmsand consumersreactions functions. Note that, prices are
determined by (8) once V and U are established. Thus, with some abuse of notation, we
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focus on the strategic choices of V and U , while letting prices adjust in the background.
In other words, we characterize the consumer and rms best response functions, which we
write as U(V ; c) and V (U ; c), respectively.
First, as an immediate consequence of Corollary 1, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 2 The rms best response V (U) is a well-dened continuous function. It is
independent of c and non-decreasing in U .
That is, the higher the utility that consumers require for purchase, the more likely a
rm is to choose a niche design. Next, consider the consumersbest response.
Lemma 3 The consumers best response U(V ; c) is a well-dened continuous function
which is decreasing in c.
That is, xing rm design choices, the higher the search cost, the more willing a con-
sumer is to purchase.
Note that Lemma 3 is silent about whether U increases or decreases with V . Indeed,
both cases may arise. A slight change in V shifts some rms from one design to the other
(and their corresponding change in prices). As one can see in equation (11), xing U ,
the only change to a consumers well-being comes from these rms. Now, depending on
the particular elasticity congurations of FN () and FB(), the consumer might or might
not like such a change; this in turn could make it either more or less valuable to continue
search, so that U can adjust in either direction. However, we argue below that it is natural
to focus on case where U decreases in V .
Given the rmsand consumersbest response functions, and abstracting from c, we
can characterize equilibria as (U; V (U)) that satisfy U(V (U)) = U . In general, there might
be multiple equilibria satisfying this. For a given search cost, there may be equilibria where
many rms choose the broad design and consumers search threshold is relatively low which,
following Lemma 2, is consistent with relatively many rms choosing the broad design.
Alternatively, rm and consumer expectations may be aligned so that in equilibrium many
rms choose a niche strategy and the consumer threshold is relatively high.
Note, however, that some of these equilibria are better behaved than others. Here
we propose to disregard unstable equilibria.15 The fact that we are later interested in
comparative statics with respect to search costs makes them even less appealing. Thus,
we concentrate only on equilibria with the property that the function U(V ()) has a slope
< 1 at the equilibrium value U . As we show in the proof to the following proposition, this
15Stability refers to the adaptive best response dynamics, as in Echenique (2002).
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is the case when
@U
@V
() is not too positive. But more importantly, we obtain the following
result:
Proposition 3 Consider local comparative statics around any stable equilibrium, then
decreasing c raises consumer surplus (higher U) and makes the fraction of niche rms
(weakly) greater (higher V ).
As discussed in the Introduction, there has been much discussion of the long tail of
the Internet. Proposition 3 provides a rst theoretical result that speaks to the issue
in demonstrating that, for stable equilibria, lower search costs bring more niche rms.
Thus, the Internet changes the kind of products on o¤er in the direction of a wide variety
of di¤erent kinds of products. In itself, of course, this result need not mean that niche
products sell more (as the discussions of the long tail suggest) nor does it address the
consequences for protability. It seems reasonable, however, that a greater fraction of
niche rms can soften price competition in such a way that rm prots increase; and that
rms that had been niche face less severe competition and sell more. Indeed, we show that
both these outcomes arise in Sections 5 and 6, where we impose distributional assumptions
that allow us to provide a full characterization.
First, however, it is instructive to consider the extreme cases where all rms choose a
broad or a niche design, which we can characterize without imposing specic distributional
assumptions.
All-broad and all-niche equilibria
We rst dene some search cost and utility values that are useful to characterize the
equilibria in which all rms either choose a broad or niche design, which we refer to as
all-broad and all-niche equilibria.
Consider rst a situation in which consumers use a U = 0 search rule. Firms would
react using a V (0) strategy. Now, using (11) one can compute the searching cost c0 that
delivers (0; V (0)) as an equilibrium:
c0 =
Z V (0)
 1
 Z 1
pvN (0) v
("  pvN (0) + v)fN (")d"
!
h(v)dv+
Z 1
V (0)
 Z 1
pvB(0) v
("  pvB(0) + v)fB(")d"
!
h(v)dv.
Next, consider the consumer stopping rule UB that makes all rms prefer the broad
strategy and the lowest quality rm indi¤erent. Given Lemma 2, this is the highest level
of search by consumers compatible with all rms o¤ering a broad product. This value UB
11
is characterized by:
pvB(UB)(1  FB(pvB(UB) + UB   v)) = pvN (UB)(1  FN (pvN (UB) + UB   v)). (13)
Using (11) we can compute the search cost cB which results in an equilibrium with rm
and consumer behavior of (UB; v):
cB :=
Z B
UB+pvB(UB) v
("  UB   pvB(UB) + v)fB(")d". (14)
We can now characterize the range of searching costs in which all-broad equilibria arise:
Proposition 4 There exists an equilibrium where all rms choose the broad design if and
only UB > 0 and c 2 [cB; c0).
Thus, search costs need to be high enough for all-broad equilibria to exist. But if they
are too high, specically higher than c0, then no consumer would initiate search. Note that
if c0  cB then UB  0 and no all-broad equilibria exist.
Analogously,one can consider all rms choosing the niche design, so that V = v, and
the consumer stopping rule that makes the highest quality rm indi¤erent in its design
choice, UN , with the associated search cost, cN ,
pvB(UN )(1  FB(pvB(UN ) + UN   v)) = pvN (UN )(1  FN (pvN (UN ) + UN   v)), and
(15)
cN =
Z N
UN+pvN (UN ) v
("  UN   pvN (UN ) + v)fN (")d". (16)
We obtain a characterization of all-niche equilibria:
Proposition 5 There exists an equilibrium where all rms choose the niche design if and
only if c < c, where c =
(
cN
c0
if UN > 0
if UN  0
.
Given that c0 > 0 and that cN > 0 when UN > 0, Proposition 5 proves the existence
of all-niche equilibria for su¢ ciently low positive search costs.
Long tails and superstars
Previously we have derived the comparative statics of rmsconsumersbehavior. It is
also of interest to consider how the distribution of prices and sales change. In particular,
to assess long-tail and superstar e¤ects, we dene these in our model.
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Denition 1 We say that a superstar e¤ect is present if the sales distribution of the rm
with the highest sales capture an increasing market share as search costs fall.
Denition 2 We say that a long tail e¤ect is present if the sales distribution of the rm
with the lowest sales capture an increasing market share as search costs fall.
Our denition of both long tail and superstar e¤ects may seem somewhat extreme in
focusing only on one rm. But in this model, because of continuity, if the extreme rm
behaves in a certain way, so do so adjacent ones. Thus, our denitions imply a mass of
rms at the tails gaining market share.
We later study distributional changes in the case in which di¤erent designs coexist in
equilibrium. But we start, here, by arguing that when all rms choose the same design
there are always superstar e¤ects but never long tail e¤ects.
Proposition 6 Suppose all rms choose the same design s, and the distribution of con-
sumer valuations Fs() is not too concave, the superstar e¤ect arises but the long tail e¤ect
does not.
A su¢ cient condition for the proposition to hold is that Fs() is convex, or equivalently
that 1   Fs(), the demand function for a monopolist rm, is concave. Note that the
assumption that Fs() is log-concave already limits how convex 1   Fs() can be (and
thereby ensures as in Lemma 1 that a rm has a unique prot-maximizing price).16
Proposition 6 suggests that the documented long tail e¤ect cannot solely be a con-
sequence of a fall in the cost of search. If rms continued delivering the same type of
products we should see low quality rms loosing market share. It is through a change to-
wards more-niche designs that the long tail arises. Note also, that holding design constant,
and following Lemma 1 and Proposition 3, rm prots decrease as search costs decrease,
which appears counterfactual to the rise of new rms on the Internet.
While, it is plausible that the Internet has reduced xed costs of entry of rms, we
demonstrate that when rms designs are strategic choices, the long tail e¤ect arises nat-
urally and that as search costs fall, rm prots can increase leading to new rm entry.
We show these e¤ects clearly by adding some further structure the model: In Section 5,
we assume ex-ante symmetry of all rms, and in Section 6, we allow for heterogeneous
types but suppose that they are uniformly distributed types and that the distributions of
consumer valuations are uniform.
16Note that this result is related to the comparative statics results in the related, but somewhat di¤erent,
model of Goldmanis et al. (2009). Their model considers rms heterogeneous in the marginal cost of pro-
duction (logconcave distribution) selling a homogenous product to heterofenous consumers with uniformly
distributed search costs.
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5 Homogeneous Firms
We consider the case where all rms are ex-ante identical. Without any loss of generality,
we assume v = 0 for all rms. To simplify notation we drop the v subscripts throughout
this section.17
In the analysis above we considered a continuous distribution of rm types. Thus, it was
without loss of generality to ignore mixed strategies. Instead, with all rms homogeneous,
we must allow for the possibility of mixed strategy equilibria. In particular, we denote 
as the proportion of rms that choose a niche rather than a broad design. Analogous to
the characterization of Section 3.3, equilibria can be summarized by (U; ), and conditions
(10)-(12) can be adapted as:
c = 
Z 1
U+pN (U)
("  U   pN (U))fN (")d"+ (1  )
Z 1
U+pB(U)
("  U   pB(U))fB(")d". (17)
 2 argmaxf(1  FB(pB(U) + U)) + (1  )p(U)(1  FN (pN (U) + U))g. (18)
(U) = 
Z 1
U+pN (U)
fN (")d"+ (1  )
Z 1
U+pB(U)
fB(")d". (19)
Note that the characterization of prices, given by (8), and the consumers participation
constraint (U  0) still apply.
Given that all rms are identical, then UB and UN as dened in (13) and (15), are
identical. We write U = UB = UN . For U > U , therefore, all rms prefer a niche
design; whereas, for U < U , all rms prefer a broad design. These equilibria have been
characterized in Propositions 4 and 5. It is only at U = U that rms might mix. However,
a mixed strategy equilibrium can exist over a wide range of search costs. This is immediate,
by noting that at U = U expression (17) can be rewritten as
c = cN + (1  )cB, (20)
where, using (14) and (16), cB and cN can be written as
cB =
Z B
U+pB(U)
("  (U + pB(U))fB(")d", and (21)
cN =
Z N
U+pB(U)
("  (U + pN (U))fN (")d". (22)
Note that each of these has an interpretation as the expected consumer surplus from
17For example, we write pN (U) instead of pvN (U).
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visiting a broad or niche rm, respectively, when the reservation utility U is such that a
rm makes identical prots whether choosing a broad or a niche design.
If cN < cB then the mixed-strategy equilibrium exactly lls the gap between the regions
where all-broad and all-niche exist and  is linear and decreasing in c . If cN > cB; then
in this region there are in principle three equilibria: one all-broad, one all mixed and one
all-niche. However, note that the mixed equilibrium in this case is unstable. Thus, for
c 2 (cB; cN ) only two pure equilibria remain.
Finally if cN = cB the mixed-strategy equilibrium has no mass. This is the case when
demands are linear (or equivalently fs() is uniform). Then the ratio of consumer surplus to
rm prots for a monopolist is constant at 12 regardless of the level of the constant marginal
costs (which for a monopolist play a similar role to the reservation utility U in our model of
monopolistic competition). Therefore, two rms facing linear demands (regardless of their
slopes) who earn the same prots must generate the same consumer surplus. This proves
that if FN () and FB() are uniform, then cN = cB. This suggests that it is easy to nd
cases where either uniqueness or multiplicity arise. For example, if demand is convex the
ratio of consumer surplus to prots is always higher than it would be in the linear case.
Thus, if FB is linear and FN is concave then cN > cB and multiplicity arises, whereas in
the opposite case, with FB concave and FN linear then a unique equilibrium exists.
In a mixed strategy equilibrium, given the demand (5) expression, and substituting for
the probability of a sale (19), we can write the sales for a broad and a niche rm respectively
as
m
(1  FB(U + pB(U))
(1  FB(U + pB(U)) + (1  )(1  FN (U + pN (U))
, and (23)
m
(1  FN (U + pN (U))
(1  FB(U + pB(U)) + (1  )(1  FN (U + pN (U))
. (24)
Note that when  = 0 or  = 1 then sales are simply given by m. This is intuitive:
Since all consumers buy and since all rms are symmetric in their behavior, they share out
the market and each rm gets the same sales volume m.
Comparative statics on search costs
As shown below, local comparative statics of all-broad and all-niche equilibria are all
monotone and straight-forward. Given this, the interesting and rich case to analyze is the
one in which mixed strategy equilibria arise. Thus, we concentrate our analysis on the
case in which c0 > cB > cN : In this case, using Propositions 4 and 5, and the analysis
above we know that: (i) for c > c0 the market breaks down; (ii) for c 2 [cB; c0) the unique
equilibrium is all-broad; (iii) for c 2 (cN ; cB) there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium with a
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positive mass of rms going broad and niche; and (iv) for c  cN all rms choose a niche
design. We characterize market outcomes in all these cases.
First, consider consumer surplus U . In the pure strategy regions, where all rms choose
the same design, the value of V does not change, and one can use Lemma 2 to conclude
that a reduction in c decreases U . It follows that for values of c where all rms choose the
same design, consumer surplus is strictly decreasing in c. In the mixed-strategy area U is
constant at U . Thus consumer surplus is monotonically decreasing overall, consistent with
the general result provided by Proposition 3.
Next consider prices. Within the pure strategy areas p is increasing in c as shown in
Lemma 1. In the mixed-strategy area broad rms charge a price pB(U) while niche rms
charge pN (U). We can write the average price of an item sold as:
(1  FB(U + pB(U))pB(U) + (1  )(1  FN (U + pN (U))pN (U)
(1  FB(U + pB(U)) + (1  )(1  FN (U + pN (U))
. (25)
This is a convex combination of pN (U) and pB(U). Given that pN (U)  pB(U) as argued
in the proof of Proposition 2 and that  is decreasing in c, the average price of an item
sold is also decreasing in c. In sum, average prices are non monotonic in c: For small and
large values of c they are increasing, while for intermediate ones they are decreasing.
The same qualitative comparative statics arises for industry prots, as these are total
sales, m, times the average price charged per sale.
Total welfare in the pure strategy areas can be written as mU + mps(U) where s 2
fB;Ng. As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, this expression increases as c decreases. In
the mixed-strategy area welfare is mU +mp which also increases as c decreases.
Finally we focus on the distribution of sales across rms. In the pure strategy area
every single rm sells m. Meanwhile, in the mixed-strategy area, the composition of rms
changes and the sales by type of rm also change. First note that 1   FB(pB(U) + U) >
1   FN (pN (U) + U) from the proof of Proposition 2. Therefore, sales by type of rm, as
in (23) and (24), are increasing in  (through the e¤ect on ) and consequently decreasing
in c. At the same time, the proportion of broad rms is increasing in c. These results are
16
illustrated in Figure 1 below.
Fig 1: Distribution of sales at
di¤erent search costs.
Summarizing, in a stable mixed-strategy region, consistent with long tailstories, as
search costs fall, there are more niche rms and each niche rm sells more. Since the total
volume of sales is constant, it follows that the niche rms account for a greater proportion
of overall sales. Note also that throughout this range of c, superstar e¤ects are present.
The toprm is broad and sells more as c goes down. The tail is niche throughout and
also sells more as c goes down. The middle region, where the mix of broad and niche is
changing, is the one that loses sales to both the head and the tail of the sales distribution.
6 Uniformly distributed quality and linear demands
We return to consider heterogeneous rms, but impose further structure that allows us
derive additional analytic results. These highlight that the results of Section 5 with homo-
geneous rms extend naturally to more general settings. We analyze the case where the
distribution of rm quality is uniform v  U [L;H]; and the distributions Fs() are uniform,
leading to linear demand functions. In particular, the niche and broad product designs are
respectively "  U [N ; N ] and "  U [B; B]. We impose that N < B and N > B:
This ensures that these are demand rotations (i.e. the demand curves cross once).
The following proposition demonstrates that similar comparative statics and qualitative
results to those in Section 5 arise in this environment. In particular, part (iii) of the
proposition demonstrates that long tail and superstar e¤ects can arise simultaneously.
Proposition 7 In the relevant range where all rms are active, (i) cB > cN . (ii) There
is a unique equilibrium (U; V ) for each search cost c. (iii) As the search cost decrease, V
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decreases and U increases. (iv) Both long tail and superstar e¤ects are present.
We illustrate the results of Proposition 7, the non-monotonicity of prices and prots,
and the superstar and long tail e¤ects through a numeric example.
Comparative statics on search costs
Consider the following rm and consumer distributions fN (x) = 116 on [ 12; 4], fB(x) =
1
6 on [ 3; 3] and h(x) = 1 on [0; 1].
Figure 2 illustrates how prices vary with search costs for a particular rm (at v = 0:9).
As one would anticipate, in general prices increase with search costs. However, when the
rm changes design from niche to broad, prices drop substantially leading to prices that are
non-monotonic in search costs. The price pattern for other vs is qualitatively the same.
Fig 2: Prices against search
costs at v = 0:9.
Next, consider average rm prots, as illustrated in Figure 3. Equivalently, since there
is a mass 1 of rms, the graph represents total industry prots. Note the two points where
the derivative is discontinuous. This are the search cost thresholds at which the equilibrium
changes from an all-niche to mixed to all-broad: Below cN = 0:09 all rms are niche, but
as search costs increase, the high quality rms gradually start switching to a broad design.
At cN = 0:18 and beyond all rms choose a broad design. Figure 2 also illustrates that
prots may be non-monotonic. The intuition is, the by now familiar one, that, as search
costs fall in the intermediate region, more rms choose a niche design. This softens price
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competition and raises prices for the industry as a whole.
Fig 3: Average rm prots
against search costs.
Finally, we turn to consider sales distributions. Figure 4 plots the distribution of sales.
Naturally, higher-quality rms sell more than low-quality rms, regardless of the search
costs. Comparing sales at di¤erent search costs, both the highest and lowest quality rm
sell more at the lower level of search costs, illustrating the superstar and long-tail e¤ect.
Fig 4: Sales against quality (v)
at two di¤erent search costs
(c = 0:1 and c = 0:15).
7 Conclusions
There has been considerable attention on the inuence of the Internet on the kind of
products o¤ered and the distribution of their sales. In particular, academic and popular
commentators have highlighted both long tail and superstar e¤ects. This paper presents a
simple and tractable model integrating consumer search and rmsstrategic product design
choices that is useful to analyze these phenomena.
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We show that in equilibrium di¤erent product designs coexist. More-advantaged rms
prefer broad-marketstrategies, seeking a very broad design and choosing a relatively low
price, while less-advantaged rms take a niche strategy with quirky products priced high
to take advantage of the (relatively few) consumers who are well-matched to the product.
Such design diversity arises even when all rms are homogeneous.
The contrast between broad-market and niche strategies has been explored elsewhere,
notably Johnson and Myatt (2006), in the earlier of work of Lewis and Sappington (1994)
and, more recently, Bar-Isaac, Caruana and Cuñat (2009); however, these models focus on
monopolies. Instead, here we present a competitive model in a market with search frictions
where these di¤erent strategies can coexist.
The comparative statics analysis presents a demand-side explanation of the long tail
e¤ect. As search costs fall, a greater proportion of rms choose the niche strategy. In part,
due to the di¤erent industry structure, but in part also since it is cheaper for consumers to
more easily seek better-suited products, niche rms account for a larger proportion of the
industrys sales. Moreover, lower search costs can simultaneously account for a superstar
e¤ect. Note, that in contrast to much discussion surrounding scale or production cost
e¤ects, we assume that production technologies do not vary and are identical in terms of
costs.
In addition, the comparative statics results highlight that prices (and prots) can be
non-monotonic in consumer search costs. There is an intuitive rationale: As search costs
fall, then as long as the product designs remain unchanged, prices fall. However, at ever
lower prices, the broad-market strategy becomes less appealing to rms, some of whom
adopt a niche strategy, charging a high price to the (few) consumers who are well-matched
for the product. Moreover, the rmschoosing to adopt a niche strategy e¤ectively impose
a positive externality on other rms, since this choice of a niche strategy e¤ectively acts as
a form of di¤erentiation that softens price competition.
One aspect that our model did not consider is the entry of new rms into the market.
This was done for simplicity, but could be easily accommodated. One could endogenize the
proportion of consumers per rm m by assuming a xed entry cost and imposing a rm
free entry condition. Qualitatively, the general results and intuition would be identical.
In particular, in the same way that average prots in the case of exogenous entry can
be non-monotonic in search costs, the number of rms can be non-monotonic in search
costs when entry is endogenous. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence on the e¤ect
of the Internet (consider, for example, countless online stores created on eBay) and hard
to reconcile if one uses a model with exogenous product design unless one imposes an
alternative complementary mechanism, such as reduction in the xed costs of entry as
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well.
In the model we have assumed that rms take their actions separately. Given that
their choices have consequences for all other rms in the industry, there is a rationale for
industry coordination. In particular, since prots can be non-monotonic in search costs,
as search costs fall exogenously the industry might benet from further reducing them.
Thus an industry response to the appearance of the Internet may be to provide additional
technologies (such as industry-sponsored comparison sites) that further reduce search costs
for consumers.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 First note that since fs(x) is logconcave then 1 Fs(x)fs(x) is strictly decreasing
in x.18
Suppose (for contradiction) that at some value of U , pvs(U) is increasing in U , then also
pvs(U) +U is increasing in U and so
1 Fs(pvs(U)+U v)
fs(pvs(U)+U v) = pvs(U) is decreasing in U , which provides
the requisite contradiction. A similar argument ensures that pvs(U) + U is increasing in U , that
pvs(U) is increasing in v; and that pvs(U)  v is decreasing in v. 
Proof of Proposition 1 The optimal design is chosen to maximize pvs(U)(1   Fs(pvs(U) +
U   v)). Now, given that pvs   U + v is an a¢ ne transformation of ps, it follows that Dv(pvs; s)
as in (5) are rotation-ordered. The proof then follows immediately from Proposition 1 in Johnson
and Myatt (2006), p. 761. 
Proof of Proposition 2 It is convenient to work directly in terms ofW = U v andcW = bU bv
and write pB(W ) := argmax p(1   FB(p +W )) and pN (W ) := argmax p(1   FN (p +W )). Then
by denition cW
pB(cW )(1  FB(pB(cW ) +cW )) = pN (cW )(1  FN (pN (cW ) +cW )). (26)
In principle, it is conceivable that there is more than one solution to this equation (we show
later that this is not the case). Consider one such solution and notice that
pB(cW )(1  FB(pB(cW ) +cW )) = pN (cW )(1  FN (pN (cW ) +cW )) (27)
 pB(cW ))(1  FN (pB(cW ) +cW )):
It follows that
1  FB(pB(cW ) +cW )  1  FN (pB(cW ) +cW ). (28)
Similarly
pN (cW )(1  FN (pN (cW ) +cW )) pN (cW )(1  FB(pN (cW ) +cW )), and so
1  FN (pN (cW ) +cW ) 1  FB(pN (cW ) +cW ) (29)
We use these facts to show that pN (cW ) > pB(cW ) and 1 FB(pB(cW )+cW ) > 1 FN (pN (cW )+cW ).
Suppose (for contradiction) that pN (cW ) < pB(cW ). Note that since N and B are drawn from a
family of demand rotations, it follows that there is some ex such that 1 FN (x) > 1 FB(x) if and
only if x > ex.
First suppose pB(cW )+cW > ex then 1 FN (pB(cW )+cW )) > 1 FB(pB(cW )+cW )) in contradiction
to (28). If instead ex  pB(cW ) +cW > pN (cW ) +cW , then (29) is contradicted.
It follows that pN (cW ) > pB(cW ) and from (26), trivially 1  FB(pB(cW )) > 1  FN (pN (cW )).
Next, returning to the maximization problem, we can rewrite pB(cW ) and pN (cW ) as the solutions
to the maximization problems explicitly and so re-write(26) as:
max
pB
pB(1  FB(pB +cW )) = max
pN
pN (1  FN (pN +cW )). (30)
18See Corollary 2 of Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005). More broadly, check this paper for functions which
do and do not satisfy the logconcavity assumption.
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A change of variable allows us to write the dual as
max
qB
(PB(qB) cW )qB = max
qN
(PN (qN ) cW )qN .
Then, by the envelope theorem dBdU jcW =  qB and dNdU jcW =  qN but as argued above qB jcW =
1 FB(pB(cW )) > qN jcW = 1 FN (pN (cW )). Thus d(B N )dU jcW < 0; which ensures that B  N =
pB(W )(1 FB(pB(W )+W )) pN (W )(1 FN (pN (W )+W )) always crosses zero from above. This
assures the uniqueness of cW follows trivially: since B   N is a continuous function there can be
at most one such crossing. 
Proof of Lemma 2 This is a consequence of Proposition 2, which also delivers the monotonicity
of V in U 
Proof of Lemma 3 Consumersbest response arise as the solution toZ V
 1
Z 1
U+pvN v
("  U   pvN + v)fN (")d"

h(v)dv+
Z 1
V
Z 1
U+pvB v
("  U   pvB + v)fB(")d"

h(v)dv = c:
(31)
The lower limits of the integrals are increasing and the integrands are decreasing in U . As a result
the left hand side above is decreasing in U . This is su¢ cient to show that U(V; c) is decreasing in c.
Moreover, for U su¢ ciently negative this expression is bigger than c, while for U su¢ ciently high
it becomes zero, which assures the existence of a U 
Proof of Proposition 3 Consider a stable equilibrium (U; V (U)). Then U(V ()) has a slope
< 1,or
@U
@V
(V (U))
@V
@U
(U) < 1.
Next, denote the left hand side expression of (31) as H(U; V ). Then
@U
@V
=
@H
@V
 @H
@U
: Thus,
stability can be expressed as equilibria satisfying
@H
@U
(V (U)) +
@H
@V
(V (U))
@V
@U
(U) < 0 (32)
We know that
@H
@U
() < 0 from Lemma 3, and that @V
@U
() > 0 from Lemma 2. Thus, a stable
equilibrium requires that
@H
@V
(V (U)) (or equivalently
@U
@V
) to be small enough.
Finally, consider local comparative statics starting at the equilibrium (U; V (U)). We know that
H(U) + H(U; V (U)) = c. If c decreases H(U) needs to decrease as well. Note that because of
expression (32) we can conclude that
@H
@U
(U) < 0; which means that U needs to increase to restore
equilibrium. Finally, using Lemma 2, we know that V (U) increases as well. 
Proof of Proposition 4 If UB  0 clearly there is no all-broad equilibrium. If UB > 0, by the
denition of c0, there is no positive search equilibrium with c > c0. Take now c 2 [cB ; c0). Using
the denitions of cB and c0 and by looking at condition (11) one can easily see that there exists
a U 2 (0; UB ] such that (U; v) constitute an equilibrium. Finally, for c < cB , there cannot be an
all-broad equilibrium. By looking at (14), note that the induced U had to be bigger than UB ;but
this would imply that the type v rm prefers a niche strategy, providing a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 5 First, it is straight-forward from the denitions of cN and c0 that c is
the highest search cost value that supports an all-niche equilibrium. We argue now that an all-niche
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equilibrium exists for any c0 < c: Lemma 3 shows that consumers best response U 0 = U(v; c0) > U .
Now Lemma 2 shows that in response to c0 and U 0 rms would like to increase V; but this is already
at its highest value v. Thus, (U 0; v) is an all-niche equilibrium at c0.
Proof of Proposition 6 As shown in Lemma 1, pv(U) + U is increasing in U: Now, since
design is xed, analogous to the proof of Lemma 3, we can conclude that a fall in c implies an
increase in U . Given that the only e¤ect of a change of c is through U; we can study changes in U
directly.
Since the total size of the market is constant (and given by m), it follows that superstar e¤ects
arise if and only if
d
dU
m


1  F (pv(U)) + U   v)

=
d
dU
m
h
1  Fs(pv (U) + U   v)
i
R v
v
[1  F (pv(U) + U   v)]h(v)dv
> 0.
A su¢ cient condition, therefore is that
d
dU
1  F (pv(U) + U   v)
1  F (pv(U) + U   v) > 0 for all v < v. (33)
Similarly a su¢ cient condition that ensures no long tail e¤ect to arise is
d
dU
1  F (pv(U) + U   v)
1  F (pv(U) + U   v) < 0 for all v > v. (34)
WritingW = U v as in the proof of Proposition 2, we can write 1 F (pv(U)+U v) = q(W )
then (33) is equivalent to ddU
q(U v)
q(U v) > 0 or q
(U   v) ddU q(U   v) > q(U   v) ddU q(U   v). A
necessary condition is that d
2
dUdv q
(U   v)jv=v > 0 since q(U   v) > q(U   v) as a consequence of
the proof of Lemma 1 and a su¢ cient condition is that d
2
dUdv q
(U   v) > 0. Consider, therefore,
d2
dW 2
q(W ) < 0. (35)
This condition implies (33) and (34) are satised.
Consider the rms maximization problem pvs [1  Fs(pvs + U   v)] this is equivalent to maxi-
mizing (P  W )(1  F (P )) and q(W ) = 1  F (P ). It follows that we can write:
d2q
dW 2
=  f d
2P
dW 2
  f 0( dP
dW
)2. (36)
By di¤erentiating the rms rst order condition with respect to W , and di¤erentiating again,
and rearranging both expressions, we obtain
dp
dW
=
1
2 + 1 F (P )f(P )
f 0(P )
f(P )
, and (37)
d2p
dW 2
=
1 + 2 1 F (P )f(P )
f 0(P )
f(P )   1 F (P )f(P ) f
00(P )
f 0(P ) )
(2 + 1 F (P )f(P )
f 0(P )
f(P ) )
3
f 0(P )
f
. (38)
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Then, we can substitute these expressions into (36) and rearrange to obtain:
d2q
dW 2
=  f(P )4
(f 0(P )2   f(P )f 00(P ))(1  F (P )) + f 0(P )

f 0(P )2 (1 F (P ))
2
f(P )2 + 5(f
0(P )(1  F (P )) + f2)

(f 0(P )(1  F (P )) + 2f(P )2)3
(39)
Logconcavity of f() implies that f 0(P )2   f(P )f 00(P ) > 0, and that 1   F () is logconcave.
This, in turn implies that f 0(P )(1 F (P ))+ f(P )2 > 0 and so also f 0(P )(1 F (P ))+ 2f(P )2 > 0.
It follows that (35) is satised as long as
f 0(P ) >   (f
0(P )2   f(P )f 00(P ))(1  F (P ))
f 0(P )2 (1 F )
2
f2 + 5(f
0(P )(1  F (P )) + f2(P ))
(40)
This is necessarily the case when f 0() > 0 or, more generally, when F () is not too concave.

Proof of Proposition 7 We use the functional forms for FN (), FB() and h() to rewrite the
equations in Section 3.3 that characterize equilibrium. First, consider prices. Condition (8) delivers
pvB(U) =
B + v   U
2
, and (41)
pvN (U) =
N + v   U
2
. (42)
Next we focus on the rm decision V . We rewrite condition (10) as:
(B + V   U)2
b2
=
(N + V   U)2
n2
, (43)
where we introduce the notation b2 = B   B and n2 = N   N for convenience. Note that n > b.
Recalling footnote 3.2 and doing some algebra on the previous expression we obtain
V = minfH;maxfU +K;Lgg, (44)
where K, dened as
K :=
Nb  Bn
n  b , (45)
is a constant that depends on exogenous parameters.
Finally, we rewrite the consumer condition (11) as:
c =
Z V
L
 Z N
N v+U
2
("  N   v + U
2
)
d"
n2
!
dv
H   L +
Z H
V
 Z B
B v+U
2
("  B   v + U
2
)
d"
b2
!
dv
H   L (46)
Suppose that there are both some rms choosing a niche and a broad design. Then, then we can
write V = U +K 2 (L;H) and simplify the previous expression to
c =
1
24
(
V   L
H   L
(V   L)2 + 3(K + N )(K + L+ N   V )
n2
+(H   V ) (H   V )
2 + 3(K + B)(K +H + B   V )
b2 (H   L) )
(47)
Note that the right hand-side is a polynomial in V . Denote it by A(V ):
Next, it follows that, here, trivially, UB = L  K and UN = H  K and so, after substituting
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for K, we obtain
cB =
1
24
(H   L)2 + 3( Nb Bnn b +B)( Nb Bnn b +H +B   L)
b2
, and (48)
cN =
1
24
(H   L)2 + 3( Nb Bnn b + N )(Nb Bnn b + L+ N  H)
n2
. (49)
It follows that
cB   cN = 1
24
(b+ n) (H   L) (H   L)(n  b)
2 + 3bn(N   B)
b2n2 (n  b) > 0, (50)
proving part (i) of the proposition.
Next, since A(V ) is a cubic, it has at most three roots. Note that n > b so as V !  1 that
A!1 and as V !1 then A!  1.
Consider
dA
dV
=
1
8
 
Lb+ Bn  V b  Ln  Nn+ V n
2
n2 (H   L) (n  b)2  
1
8
 
Bb+Hb  Nb Hn  V b+ V n
2
b2 (H   L) (n  b)2 (51)
and
d2A
dV 2
=
1
4
Hn2   Lb2 + bn(N   B)
b2n2 (H   L)  
1
4
n2   b2
b2n2 (H   L)V . (52)
Now V 2 (minfK;Lg;H). Note that d2AdV 2 jV=H = 14 (H L)b+n(H B)bn2(H L) > 0 and since d
3A
dV 3 < 0
this means that d
2A
dV 2 > 0 throughout the relevant region.
Now consider dAdV jH =   18 2n(N B) (H L)(n b)n2(n b) . If dAdV jH =   18 2n(N B) (H L)(n b)n2(n b) < 0 then
since d
2A
dV 2 > 0 through the region then
dA
dV < 0 and there can be at most one solution to A = 0.
This is the case, if and only if,
2n
N   B
n  b > H   L. (53)
Note that this a condition that there should be less dispersion in vertical quality than in the
dispersion of match realizations. This seems a reasonable if all rms make positive sales.
Well, since, throughout we assume that all rms make positive sales, consider the case where all
rms are niche (just) so that V = H (which we know must arise when c is su¢ ciently small following
Proposition 5) then the lowest quality rm makes positive sales as long as pLN (H  K) > 0. Note
that
pLN (H  K) = N + L H +K
2
=
N + L H + Nb Bnn b
2
=
1
2
n
 
N   B
  (H   L)(n  b)
n  b .
(54)
So pLN (H  K) > 0 if and only if n N Bn b > H   L which, trivially, implies (53).
This shows that dAdV jH < 0 and so also that dAdV < 0 for all V 2 (minfK;Lg;H) thus there is a
unique solution to A = 0 and, moreover, that V is decreasing in c. This proves (ii) and (iii) of the
Proposition.
Finally, consider the sales of the highest quality rm. Note that throughout this region, it
chooses the broad strategy, following Proposition 2, so its sales are given by B pHB(V K)b2 =
27
B pHB(V K)
b2 =
B  B+H V+K2
2b2 =
1
4
 
B  H  K + V

Note that this is increasing in V and V is decreasing in c, so sales for the highest quality rm
rise as search costs fall, proving the second half of part (iv) of the Proposition. The rst half is
analogous and so is omitted. 
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